Extended Mind

I'm taking a fascinating course called "Biology of Mind," taught by UW-Madison paleo-superstar John Hawks. Our musings are posted on a class blog, and I thought I may as well combine my efforts for a few of my posts.

This week, I reviewed a paper on a researcher's analysis of consciousness and Extended Mind. EM is the idea that portions of the environment can be viewed as extensions of the mind; our minds aren't limited to neural activity in our brain and include interactions with the outside world. A classmate pointed out that Clark, the author of the review and co-author of one of the first papers on the topic, doesn't necessarily disagree with EM, but rather other researchers' tendencies to claim EM constitutes consciousness as well.

Photo by laimagendelmundo

So here's an abridged version of my post:

The article I'm reviewing, "Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head" by Andy Clark, addresses research concerning the "extended conscious mind," or the ability to view one's "embodied and situated brain" as the physical origin of the mind -- rather than the brain alone (Clark, 2009, p. 964). Let's start this analysis with a few definitions:

• The extended mind: The idea that "cognition and mental states" may depend on physical mechanisms outside of the Central Nervous System and the brain (p. 965).
• The embodied and situated brain: the brain plus other "physical stuff," Clark notes (p. 964). I interpret this to include the entire body, specifically other areas that relay sensory data of the outside world. Some researchers consider material structures (defined below) as representative as well. This concept is vital to the EM theory.
• Extra-neural material structures: Physical objects that serve to store mental data and can present them to the mind. For example, a notebook is a "material vehicle" that can store abstract beliefs (e.g., dispositional or standing) (p. 966). Though this is slightly different (and off topic), I can't help but think of the soul-splitting Harry Potter Horcruxes that immortalize people in physical objects...
• Enactivism: Personal perspective is not received, but rather physically enacted through sensorimotor behavior (p. 969). Choosing what you do with your body shapes your perspective, and thus, consciousness.

Essentially, Clark looks at previous literature, including a paper he authored, and reevaluates previous claims about EM and the possibility of EM creating consciousness. He comes to the conclusion that the existence of consciousness from EM is not supported. He challenges that if this theory gained acceptance, efforts would still be futile in determining where the mind stops and the rest of the world begins. After all, his colleagues are striving to delineate the mind/world boundary, not muddle it further.

I found the original concept of EM using "extra neural material structures" (e.g., material objects) particularly interesting because I had never thought of the mind this way before.

Concerning notebooks, cameras, computers, and so on, it's a tempting idea to accept these vectors as environmental parts of the mind. I think science journalist Carl Zimmer summarizes this concept quite well in an article in Discover. 

In Clark's original work on EM (1998), he contrasts someone who stores mental information internally with someone who is mentally crippled by Alzheimer's disease and uses a notepad to remind himself of information.  The person with Alzheimer's actively uses a physical object to serve as the memory his mind lacks. 

This brings me to the intersection of our minds and digital presences.  Though I don't think what we do online serve as real extensions of our minds, I do think these activities serve a greater purpose for memory storage and expression.  Is the Google calendar you rely so heavily on an extension of your mind?  Personally, I don't think so; but, it does condition your mind to depend on it.  I honestly wonder what such digital extensions do to the brain.  Are those of us dependent on technology less likely to remember things without its aid?

Photo by Spinstah

In this light, I think components of EM are worth exploring further.

What do you think? Is EM a legitimate possibility?